Apportionment problem has a very long history of more than 200 years and has been challenged actively by many applied mathematicians and operations researchers. In the last 200 years many apportionment methods have been proposed and various types of properties, which they should desirably satisfy, have been proposed and investigated although the apportionment problem itself has not been completely solved yet.
Introduction
In the present Japan's House of Representatives there are 511 seats available and there are 130 political constituencies in the whole country. Among these 130 political constituencies the number of seats assigned to each ranges from 1 to 6 and in most constituencies they are between 3 and 5. Total number of seats, i.e., the house size, started from 466 in 1947, then it was increased several times reaching 511 in 1976, 512 in 1986 and currently 511 again after 1992. With the rapid and high economic growth in Japan in the 1960's, however, the distribution of our population drastically changed, i.e. our population has become heavily concentrated in big city areas while rural areas have been burdened by a serious "isolation" problem. In 1947 the largest number of seats per capita was 1.51 times the smallest. Since then, the largest-smallest ratio has begun to increase, reaching 3.21 in 1960, 4.83 in 1970, and 5.12 in 1985. Thus the "weight of one vote" in the populated areas became much less than that in the rural areas and the issue of weight gap between growing and declining political constituencies has become one of the most socially and politically controversial problems in our country. Our government revised the electoral system in order to reduce the weight gap among constituencies by increasing the house size by 19 in 1964 and by 20 with the total number of seats 511 in 1975. Then in 1986 our government increased the number of seat allocations in 8 political constituencies and decreased it in 7 constituencies making the total 512, and again in 1992 the number of seat allocations was increased in 9 political constituencies and decreased in 10 constituencies with the total number reaching 511 again.
In 1983 our Supreme Court gave a decision responding to the appeal that a weight gap of more than 3.0 may be unconstitutional. Since then, several similar decisions have been given in various judicial courts. After the Recruit scandal in 1988 political reform including the change to the new electoral voting system has been a serious concern for the nation's political community, our ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the Diet has also recognized the importance of this problem. After very harsh arguments and struggles among politicians a new political reform bill passed the Diet in January, 1994. Our new electoral voting system includes reducing the total number of seats from the present 511 to 500 as a combination of 300 single seat constituency and 200 proportional representation seats. The new election system is believed to promote a new realignment of several political parties.
Given the total number of seats and the distribution of each constituency's population the apportionment problem tries to allocate seats "fairly" among political constituencies. Let the set of N political constituencies be S = {1, 2, ... , N}, and let the population of political constituency i E S be Pi. Then the apportionment problem is to partition a given positive integer K into nonnegative integral parts {di liE S} such that
and such that these parts are "as near as possible" proportional to a set of nonnegative integers {PI, P2, ... , P N }, respectively.
Denoting the total population by P, and the total number of seats, i.e., the house size, by K, the "ideal" number of seats allocated to the constituency i, i.e., the "exact quota" qi, is given by
Pi K qi = --P where P is the total population given by (1.4) Hence we have
Usually exact quotas {qi liE S} all have fractional parts. Therefore, the problem becomes how to round the fractions {qi liE S} to their "nearby" integral values keeping their sum equal to a given value K. Balinski and Young have done quite extensive work on the above problem (see e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] ), and many apportionment methods have been proposed as mentioned in the next section (see e.g., [8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] for surveying the methods). Several properties are required for the apportionment method to satisfy. For example, we want the apportionment method to have the quota property that the number of seats given to each constituency is either rounded-up or rounded-down by an exact quota. We may want the house monotone property that a constituency should not be given less representation if the total number of seats increases and the distribution of population of each constituency remains the same. Bias is another important factor for the apportionment method. Namely the apportionment method cannot be accepted if it tends to be always biased in favor of the larger or the smaller constituencies. There are various "natural" requirements for acceptable apportionment methods. Some of these "requirements", however, are inconsistent. No matter which apportionment method is accepted, it will possess certain" defects". Namely, we may have to decide in advance which propenies must be satisfied, and which" defects" are acceptable before we employ our own apportionment method.
In this paper we consider the bias of several apportionment methods, focused on the parametric divisor method proposed in [13] . We investigate the unbiasedness of several traditional apportionment methods and compare them with the parametric divisor method. We then propose a range of appropriate parameter values for the parametric divisor method in order to obtain higher unbiasedness as well as impartialness and fairness with respect to the population size of each constituency. In Section 2 we review several representative apportionment methods and their bias property. Then we show our results related to characterizing parametric divisor method from the viewpoint of the local measure of inequity. In Section 3 we give the results of our numerical experiments using Japan's House of Representatives data, and compare these results with the apportionment methods described therein. In the last Section, we conclude our paper by giving certain evaluations obtained from our results and numerical experiments.
Apportionment methods and the bias
One of the most common apportionment methods is the largest fraction method suggested by A. Hamilton at the United States Congress in 1791, and employed by the Congress from 1851 until 1910, which we shall denote by LF M. The LF M first assigns each constituency i E S its lower quota LqiJ, where LqJ denotes the largest integer less than or equal to q.
Then we define the fraction of each constituency ti as follows.
Sorting the set {ti liE S} from the largest, arbitrarily for the equal elements, we define the set of suffices of the first K -EiES LqiJ constituencies in the ordering by T. Then the LF M allocates an additional seat to the constituencies belonging to the set T; namely, the whole allocation {di liE S} of the LF M is given as follows. The apportionment method described above is called the divisor method based upon the divisor function v( d). The divisor method can be defined equivalently as follows. From (2.4) and (2.5), the parameter ,\ has to satisfy the following relation for all i E S for di > 0 (2.6) for di = 0
This means that we have the following max-min inequality (2.7)
where we permit dividing by 0 and assume that if > It if Pi > Pj. Defining the rank
we can write the above relation (2.8) as follows. There exists an alternative way of expressing the general apportionment methods based upon the divisor function v( di) recursively. Let d~ indicate the number of seats allocated to the political constituency i E S given the total number of seats k E {O, 1, ... , K}. Then an iterative algorithm for the general divisor method can be written as follows. Algorithm (general divisor method)
Step
Step 2 (2.11) (2.12)
Step 3 k = k + 1. If k = K, then stop. Otherwise, go to step 2.
~ shown in the above algorithm, for k = 0, the allocation must be zero for every constituency. Given that an allocation d k = (dt, ... , d'Jv) has been determined for a total number of seats k, an allocation for a size k + 1 is found by giving one more seat to the constituency i for which the rank function r(Pi, di) is a maximum.
Based upon different divisor functions we can define an infinite number of different divisor methods (see e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15] 
Measure of inequity E(Pi' di; Pj, dj) dp'
Using a parameter t such that 0 ::; t ::; 1, the divisor function of the parametric divisor method (refer to [13] ), which we denote by PDM, can be written as follows.
(2.13) vPD(d,t)=d+t
Comparing the above function VPD( d, t) with those in Table 1 , we find that t = 0, 1/2, and 1 correspond to those functions of the S D M, M F M and G D M, respectively. Now the apportionment method based upon P DM can be described as follows. Let the parameter for P DM be A = APD, then ApD can be determined as the maximum A satisfying
If (2.14) holds as an equality for A = APD, then the allocation {di liE S} is given by
If (2.14) holds as a strict inequality, then let 
Hence the following relation holds
There are several properties for each apportionment method to satisfy. An apportionment method M is said to satisfy the house monotone property if no political constituency i E S decreases its allocation when the house size increases from k to k + 1.
The violation of this property is often referred to as the "Alabama paradox". The word "Alabama paradox" originates from the fact that when the V.S. Congress was using the LF M in 1881, the state of Alabama was allocated 8 representatives, while they received 7 when the total went to 300 from 299. Therefore, the LF M does not satisfy this property. All other divisor methods satisfy it. We consider the local measures of inequity between pairs of constituencies. Let the population in the constituency i E S be Pi and the number of seats assigned be dj. We say that constituency i is favored over j when the number of seats per individual in the constituency i is greater than or equal to that in j; namely, 4L 2:: !b.., (i.e., El ~ EL). Huntington for all pairs i and j with i favored over j.
Using the above definitions we obtain the following theorem. 
Proof We do not admit any transfer of a seat from constituency i to j if
Namely for all i E Sand j E S we obtain as follows. we can conclude that the above case in Theorem 2.1 is equivalent to the case that the divisor function is given as vPD(d) = d+t. In other words, the pairwise transfering procedure given by the criterion in Theorem 2.1 gives the same apportionment solution as P DM.
Whether an apportionment method is generally in favor either of the larger constituencies or of the smaller ones is very important in order to evaluate the bias of the apportionment method. Namely no apportionment method can be accepted if it has a persistent bias toward the larger or the smaller constituencies. However measuring the bias of the apportionment method is difficult. There has not yet been established a completely acceptable definition or a model for determining whether or not an apportionment method is biased.
Given two apportionment methods M and M' Balinski and Young [8] 
Theorem 2.2 Let M and M' be two divisor methods with divisor functions v(d) and v'(d), respectively, satisfying v( d) = v' (d)
+
Proof Let dE A(v,p,K) and d' E A(v',p,K) be the allocations obtained from methods
and Using the above relation we obtain the following
The above contradicts the assumption. Thus the assumption d: < di and dj > dj never occurs, which completes the proof. 0 The above theorem leads to the following Corollary. we know that these methods tend to favor small constituencies in this order since we have 3 Numerical experiments There are 130 political constituencies in Japan's House of Representative (HOR), each (CNST.) of which has a population (PPL.), quota(QTA.) and a current allocation (CRT) of representatives as shown in Table 2 .
Corollary 2.3 Let the PDM's Ml and M2 be based upon divisor functions v(d)
=d < d + t < d + ~ < d + 1 for all d.
Applying six apportionment methods (G D M, M FM, EP M, H M M, SDM and LF M)
to Japan's HOR data based upon the 1990 Census, we obtain the results given in Table 2 . First we recognize that in Japan's current allocation of HOR seats to smaller constituencies, which are mostly in rural areas, are favored over larger constituencies, which are mainly in urban areas. The results in Table 2 show that the apportionment methods GDM, MFM, EPM, HMM and SDM are, in this order, relatively more favorable to those constituencies with larger population, and Japan's current allocation of HOR seats is rather close to that of the SDM. The apportionment method LF M always satisfies the quota property since the allocation by the LF M is either rounded up or rounded down from the exact quota, i.e., stays within the quota. We believe that the LF M is the most unbiased method since it satisfies the quota property although, unfortunately, it violates the house property. The result in Table 2 also shows that the method LF M gives similar apportionment to M F M or EP M. In the 1910's and 1920's in the United States there was a very intense controversy over whether the M F M or the EP M was more unbiased (see, e.g., [8, 10] ). From our numerical results and historical arguments done so far, we can say that "impartial (unbiased to both larger or smaller constituencies) and appropriate" apportionment methods should be either M F M or E PM, or between or around these methods. Applying the P DM to our HOR data we obtain the apportionment results as given in Table 3 using the parameter value t for 0 :::; t :::; 1. The results in Table 3 indicate that the P D M with a smaller parameter value t is more favorable to smaller constituencies while that with a larger parameter value t is more favorable to larger constituencies as obtained from Theorem 2.2. Table 3 . Final apportionments by parametric divisor method CNST. PARAMETER 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 HKID-l 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 FKOK-l 9  9  9  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  TKYO-ll  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  7  7  KNGW-2  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  7  7  7  CHBA-l  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  7  7  7  7  CHBA-4  8  8  8  8  85  5  5  5  5  4  4  TCHG-l  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  4  4  4 We originally define the measure of bias related to the apportionment method as follows.
(3.1 ) Table 5 shows the above measure of bias for six traditional apportionment methods. In Table 4 we give the numerical results of the P D M for the parameter values 0.4 ::; t ::; 0.5.
Using the numerical results of the PDM in Table 3 , we can calculate the measure of bias ~t for parameter values 0 ::; t ::; 1 as shown in the Fig.1 . From Table 4 we obtain Fig.2 showing the details of the measure of bias ~t for 0.35 ::; t ::; 0.5. We can easily recognize that ~t takes the minimum at around 0.43 ::; t ::; 0.44. 
e=(~~-1)X100
The above definition is equivalent to Balinski and Young's ( [8] , p.126). Numerical results for the measure of bias et are given in Table 6 for six traditional apportionment methods. Fig.3 shows the measure of bias et for parameter values 0 ::; t ::; 1. Fig.4 Table 2 we know that the EP M gives exactly the same allocation of seats to our 130 constituencies as the LF M. Comparing the allocation of the M F M with that of the EPM, we know that the latter method gives one less seat to TCHG-l (larger constituency) and one more seat to YMGC-2 (medium size constituency). From Table  4 
Summary and conclusion
In this paper we investigated the unbiasedness of the PDM based upon the parameter t given in (2.13). As mentioned in sections 2 and 3, P DM satisfies the house monotone property for any t such that 0 5 t 5 1 as it belongs to the divisor method. It does not guarantee the quota property as do other apportionment methods (with the exception of the LF M ). In section 2 we characterized the P DM from the viewpoints of the local measure of inequity, which was originally proposed in our work (see [13] ). Then we found the properties of the P D M related to the maximum parameter values and the allocation obtained from the P D M, which we expect would be useful to gain more insights into the allocation by the P DM. As shown in section 3, from the results of our numerical experiments as illustrated in Tables 5 and 6 we can conclude that the apportionment method LF M is located between M F M and E P M from the viewpoint of biasedness to the population size of the constituency. As history shows (see e.g. [8, 10] ), there was a harsh controversy in the U.S. Congress in the 1950's over whether the M F M or the EP M should be accepted. Although Balinski and Young [8, 10] insist that the M F M is the only unbiased divisor method, we believe that generally the M F M is more favorable to larger constituencies as most numerical examples, although they are hypothetical and not real data, violate the upper quota property (see e.g. [10, 12] ) and as our own numerical experiments also show.
In conclusion, we believe that the method LF M, which satisfies the quota property, gives" a most reasonable and impartial" assignment of seats to the constituency although it does not satisfy the house monotone property. Based upon our numerical experiments related to 1990 census data of Japan's House of Representatives we would like to strongly recommend the P DM with the parameter value 0.43 5 t 5 0.44 since it gives almost the same assignment as the LF M as shown in section 3, and importantly, it satisfies the house monotone property. In this sense we evaluate tl:.e unbiasedness of the Condorcet method (see, e.g., Balinski and Young [8] ), which is equivalent to t=O.4 for the PDM and is close to our recommendation of the parameter value.
Presently we are investigating other properties of population monotonicity, constituency properties.
